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INTRODUCTION 
The process accompanying the UN’s 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) 
culminated in an agreement at the Third Conference of the Parties (COP3) held at Kyoto, Japan, 
in December 1997: Industrialized nations agreed that, by the first commitment period 2008-
2012, they would reduce their collective emissions of CO2 and equivalent greenhouse gases 
(hereafter just CO2) to an average of 5.2% below what they were in 1990. Since then, countries 
have sought to build on Kyoto and reduce CO2 emissions even further in order to address 
predicted climate change. Given the perceived urgency of addressing climate change and in an 
effort to get serious about climate change, the leaders of the G8 countries agreed at a July 2009 
meeting in L'Aquila, Italy, to limit the increase in global average temperature to no more than 
2°C above pre-industrial levels. They would do this by reducing their own greenhouse gas 
emissions by 80% or more, and global emissions by 50%, by 2050 relative to 1990 or some more 
recent year. The European Union already has in place a ‘20-20-20 target’ – a 20% reduction in 
CO2 emissions from 1990 levels by 2020, with 20% of energy to be produced from renewable 
sources.
1
The United States also appeared ready to reduce CO2 emissions by a significant amount: The 
House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act (also known as 
Waxman-Markey) on June 26, 2009. The Act required large emitters to reduce their aggregate 
CO2 emissions by 3% below 2005 levels in 2012, 17% below 2005 levels in 2020, 42% in 2030, 
and 83% in 2050. The Senate has yet to pass legislation, but had been contemplating major 
reductions in emissions. The American Power Act (2009) proposed by Senators Kerry and 
Lieberman added to the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade scheme a carbon tax on large 
emitters. The tax would have a floor of $12 per ton CO2 that would rise by the rate of inflation 
 At COP15 in Copenhagen in late 2009, and again at COP16 in Cancun, Mexico in 2010, 
the EU was prepared to impose a 30% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2020, if there had been 
some sort of climate agreement.  
                                                      
1 This target is directed particularly at the countries of Western Europe, or the EU-25, although more 
recent entrants to the EU are also expected to make significant gains towards its achievement. Page | 2 
 
plus 3 percent, and a ceiling of $25 indexed to inflation plus 5 percent. This bill was 
subsequently replaced by a 2010 bill (S.3813) sponsored by Senator Bingham to create a 
national ‘Renewable Electricity Standard’ (RES). It required that, by 2021, 15% of the electricity 
sold by an electric utility be generated from wind or certain ‘other’ renewable energy sources 
(presumably solar, etc., and not hydro); up to four of the 15 percent points could, theoretically, 
be achieved by actions that improve energy efficiency, although these were tightly defined. 
To date, no legislation has actually been passed by the Senate and, given Republican gains at 
the mid-term elections in November 2010 (including a majority of the seats in the House), it will 
be difficult but perhaps not impossible to pass climate legislation, especially legislation that 
involves some sort of economic instrument, cap-and-trade or carbon taxes. At the same time, 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency was granted power to regulate CO2 emissions as a 
result of a 2007 Supreme Court ruling that CO2 is a pollutant.  
To achieve the kinds of emission reduction targets envisioned, it is necessary to radically 
transform the fundamental driver of global economies – the energy system. The main obstacle 
to so doing is the abundance and ubiquity of fossil fuels, which can be expected to power the 
industrialized nations and the economies of aspiring industrial economies into the foreseeable 
future. Realistically, global fossil fuel use will continue to grow and remain the primary energy 
source for much of the next century (Bryce 2010; International Energy Agency 2009; Duderstadt 
et al. 2009; Smil 2003).  
ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR REDUCING CO2 EMISSIONS 
Several options are available to the authority for reducing reliance on fossil fuels – for reducing 
emissions of carbon dioxide. These are regulation (also known as mandates) and economic 
incentives, namely, a carbon tax, a cap-and-trade scheme or subsidies of one form or other. 
Each is discussed below. 
Regulation 
The government can choose to regulate emissions of CO2 from fossil fuels, and other sources, in 
a variety of different ways. In the transportation sector, fleet fuel economy standards can be 
mandated: These require that an automobile manufacturer’s sales of vehicles in a particular 
market achieve a specified average fuel economy. Coal-fired power plants may be required to 
install equipment to capture CO2 from the smokestack (or new plants must be able to do so). 
Electric system operators or utilities may be required to derive a specified proportion of their 
power from renewable generating sources. In some cases, the authority may even specify the 
extent to which the operator must rely on wind generated power.  
Most environmental economics textbooks provide a simple demonstration as to why economic 
incentives are more efficient than regulation. Hence, it is surprising that policymakers still rely 
on regulation as a principal means of tackling market failures caused by unwanted emissions.  
Aside from transaction costs, which include monitoring compliance, direct intervention leads to Page | 3 
 
economic inefficiencies because economic agents seek only to comply with the regulations, but 
not lower emissions at least cost. CO2 emissions are not necessarily reduced by those firms that 
can do so at the lowest cost. In addition, as new firms enter or new plants are built, emissions 
can expand even while mandates, such as requirements to adopt the best available technology, 
are met. Thus, there is no guarantee that regulations will actually reduce CO2 emissions. Yet, by 
failing to pass legislation to address climate change, the U.S. Congress has chosen to rely, 
through the Environmental Protection Agency, on regulation as the vehicle for lowering CO2 
emissions. 
Carbon Taxes and Emissions Trading 
Carbon taxes target prices, while cap-and-trade targets quantity. A carbon tax raises the cost of 
emitting carbon dioxide, thereby increasing the price of energy produced by fossil fuels and, if 
correctly applied, the costs of energy from biomass burning (as it also releases CO2).
2
Given a choice between carbon taxes and cap-and-trade, economists generally prefer carbon 
taxes for three reasons. First, the transaction costs associated with emission trading are likely 
much larger than with a tax. 
 With cap 
and trade, emissions of CO2 are restricted; this causes them to take on value, thereby raising 
costs of releasing CO2 into the atmosphere. By permitting economic agents to trade the limited 
quantity of emissions (the cap), the cost of a permit falls to its lowest possible value. In 
principle, the state can choose the tax level (price) or the number of emission permits to 
auction (quantity), but if all is known the outcome will be the same – the targeted level of CO2 
emissions reduction will be achieved. 
Second, a carbon tax and cap-and-trade scheme are identical in theory, but when abatement 
costs and/or benefits are uncertain, picking a carbon tax can lead to the ‘wrong’ level of 
emissions reduction while choosing a quantity can result in a mistake about the forecasted 
price that firms will have to pay for auctioned permits (Weitzman 1974). Such errors have social 
costs. If the marginal cost of abatement is steep while the marginal benefit (marginal damages 
avoided) curve is relatively flat, then a small increase in the number of permits that are issued 
can have a large impact on their price (Pizer 1997; Weitzman 1974, 2002). "Uncertainty about 
compliance costs causes otherwise equivalent price and quantity controls to behave differently 
and leads to divergent welfare consequences ... [so] that prices controls are more efficient 
[than quantity controls]" (Pizer 2002). On economic grounds, a carbon tax is preferred over cap-
and-trade. 
Finally, large income transfers are involved. With a tax, the authority drives a wedge between 
the supply and demand curves that causes the price of energy from fossil fuels to rise above the 
marginal cost of providing that energy by the amount of the tax. The government collects the 
difference as revenue. With a quantity restriction (a cap), the difference between price and 
marginal cost of provision constitutes a large rent that is ‘up for grabs.’ Large industrial emitters 
                                                      
2 Proponents of biomass energy argue that it is CO2 neutral, but this is not the case as pointed out below 
in the discussion pertaining to the use of biomass for power generation.  Page | 4 
 
can capture this rent if all or a significant proportion of the permits are grandfathered rather 
than auctioned. Rent seeking occurs and, thus, grandfathering of permits is likely to be required 
for cap-and-trade scheme to be politically acceptable. Likewise, large financial intermediaries 
will lobby for cap and trade as they gain from trading permits. Further, there is the potential for 
corruption if permits can be purchased abroad through such devices as the Clean Development 
Mechanism. If that is the case, we have emissions trading but not a true cap-and-trade scheme, 
and emission reduction targets are unlikely to be met. 
Politicians have generally eschewed carbon taxes as these are seen as just another means to 
raise overall taxes. Resistance in the U.S. to cap and trade has also come about because it too is 
increasingly viewed as another form of taxation. This most likely explains the failure of the U.S. 
Congress to pass climate legislation. 
Subsidies 
Subsidies are also a form of economic incentive. Governments can subsidize everything from 
research and development of new technologies that substitute for or reduce reliance on fossil 
fuels to the construction of energy-efficient buildings and manufacturing plants; states can 
even subsidize the purchase of end products such as eco-friendly vehicles. Governments have 
subsidized biofuel production facilities, research into electric, hybrid and hydrogen vehicles, 
and the construction of biomass power generating plants, wind turbines and solar photovoltaic 
panels. Needless to say, firms prefer subsidies over taxes and emissions trading (unless they can 
capture large rents from the grandfathered emission permits); sometimes the public even 
appears to prefer subsidies, but only as long as they are unaware of the tradeoffs in public 
spending on other programs and/or assume the funds spent for this purpose will reduce 
expenditures on things they oppose.  
In practice, one finds many of the above economic instruments operating simultaneously. For 
example, a government might subsidize farmers for growing energy crops and energy 
companies for building biofuel processing plants, while at the same time regulating ethanol 
content in gasoline and imposing carbon taxes on gasoline from petroleum. Indeed, they might 
even at the same time be subsidizing exploration for new sources of petroleum or natural gas.  
Feed-in tariffs are a particular type of subsidy to the electricity sector. They guarantee power 
producers a fixed price for their electricity for a specified period of time. The electricity sector is 
important because it already accounts for nearly one-fifth of the world’s final energy 
consumption, power can be generated from a great variety of energy sources, and electricity 
could possibly play a large role in future transportation, whether directly to re-charge electric 
vehicles or indirectly by producing hydrogen fuel. Hence, we turn our attention to the 
electricity sector. 
ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION 
Fossil fuels are the most important source of energy in the global generation of electricity 
(Figure 1). Approximately two-thirds of electricity is produced from fossil fuels, while the Page | 5 
 
remainder comes primarily from hydro and nuclear sources. Geothermal, biomass, solar, wind 
and other sources contribute a meager 2.6% of the energy required to produce electricity.  
 
Figure 1: Global Electricity Production by Energy Source, 2007, Percent, Total = 19,771 TWh 
To obtain some notion regarding which countries generate the most electricity and the 
importance of coal in the global electricity generating mix, consider Table 1. Nearly 20,000 
terawatt hours (TWh), or 20 petawatt hours (PWh),
3
Although oil dominates total global consumption of energy because of its use in transportation, 
very little oil is used to generate electricity. With the exception of a few large, base-load power 
plants that rely on oil, petroleum is used mainly in diesel generators that power small grids such 
as those found in remote communities, and in much of sub-Sahara Africa where few 
alternatives to diesel generation currently exist. While energy security is often cited in the 
United States as a reason to subsidize wind, solar and other renewable sources of power 
generation, electricity generation is not reliant on imports of energy from offshore (e.g., the 
Middle East, Nigeria and elsewhere). As noted, the United States imports (hydro) electricity 
from Canada but the remainder is generated from domestic sources of energy.  
 of electricity were generated in 2007, the 
latest year for which statistics are available from the International Energy Agency (IEA 2010a, 
2010b). Notice that the U.S. and China are the largest producers of electricity and also the 
largest producers of coal-fired power. Other large industrial nations generate large amounts of 
electricity, with many relying on coal (Figure 1). Canada is the sixth largest producer, but much 
of it comes from hydro sources and a significant amount (≈ 25 TWh annually) is exported to the 
U.S. Clearly, rich countries are rich because they consume large amounts of energy, especially 
electricity.  
                                                      
3 A watt (W) equals 1 joule (J) per second. A kilowatt (kW) equals 1000 W; megawatt (MW) = 10
6 W; 
gigawatt (GW) = 10
9 W; terawatt (TW) = 10
12 W; petawatt (PW) = 10
15 W. Kilo is abbreviated with k and 
equals 10
3; Mega (M, 10
6); Giga (G, 10
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Table 1: Largest Electricity Producers, Total and by Selected Fossil Fuel Energy Source, 2007, 
TWh 
TOTAL    Coal/Peat    Gas 
U.S.  4323    China  2656    U.S.  915 
China  3279    U.S.  2118    Russia  487 
Japan  1123    India  549    Japan  290 
Russia  1013    Japan  311    Rest of World  2435 
India  803    Germany  311    Total  4127 
Canada  640    South Africa  247   
    Germany  630    Australia  194    Oil 
Rest of World  7960    Korea  171    Total  1114 
Total  19,771    Russia  170   
   
   
  Poland  148   
   
   
  Rest of World  1353   
   
   
  Total  8228   
    Source: International Energy Agency (2010b) 
An indication of the costs of producing electricity from various sources is provided in Table 2. 
The costs of producing electricity from wind and solar sources have fallen dramatically, while 
costs of geothermal, tidal, wave and some other renewable energy technologies are not yet 
known because they are in various stages of development. Advances in nuclear power 
generation technology and experience also continue, particularly with regards to performance 
and safety (Ansolabehere et al. 2003; Deutch et al. 2009). Yet, most renewable energy 
programs tend, in practice and probably realistically, to ignore geothermal, tidal and wave 
energy in favor of wind and solar power. But they also exclude from consideration the 
substitution of natural gas for coal and greater reliance on nuclear energy, two important and 
proven low-carbon technologies. In essence, therefore, the objective of reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions is confused with encouraging renewable energy in the generation of 
electricity (Deutch et al. 2009, p.9). 
Consider the future prospects of renewable energy sources in generating electricity, especially 
their near-term prospects as many developed countries have ambitious greenhouse gas 
emission targets, some of which are supposed to come into force within a decade. A major 
problem facing renewable energy relates to its low energy density. As indicated in Table 3, the 
energy density of renewable energy sources is simply too low compared to that of fossil fuels 
and nuclear power to make them sufficiently competitive with fossil fuels and nuclear power. 
Therefore, subsidies are required. Nearly forty countries, and many more jurisdictions if 
provinces, states and cities are counted separately, provide potential generators of renewable 
power with feed-in tariffs. The four most common renewable sources of energy that qualify for 
feed-in tariffs are biomass, small-scale (usually run-of-river) hydro, solar and wind. The 
prospects of these four energy sources are briefly discussed in order below. With the exception 
of biomass, these renewable energy sources tend to be intermittent and therefore non-
dispatchable.  Page | 7 
 
Table 2: Lifetime Generation Costs by Generating Type, $ per MWh
a 
Generating Type
b  Midpoint  Low  High 
Wind onshore  68.08  36.39  168.71 
Wind offshore  78.54  59.09  144.38 
Solar thermal  193.64  193.64  315.20 
Solar PV  192.21  141.10  2195.39 
Run of river/small hydro  108.28  46.45  283.02 
Large-scale hydro  53.12  53.12  99.33 
Nuclear  30.71  24.34  80.26 
Coal (lignite)  39.35  34.40  75.35 
Coal (high quality)  31.90  30.30  80.85 
Coal (integrated coal gas)  44.73  31.94  69.15 
Gas (CCGT)  54.62  44.69  73.24 
Gas (open)  54.64  54.64  57.33 
Waste incineration  11.39  -4.68  61.19 
Biomass  48.74  43.64  117.59 
a Costs include capital, operating and maintenance, and fuel costs over the lifetime of a power plant, 
discounted to the present and ‘levelized’ over the expected output of the generating source over its 
lifetime. Values are in 2008 US dollars. The midpoint and low values are based on a 5% discount rate, as 
is the low value; the high value is derived using a 10% discount rate. 
b Open-cycle gas turbines lose exhaust heat but can respond quickly to changes in demand; 
closed-cycle gas turbines (CCGT) recycle exhaust heat, which makes them suitable as base-load 
plants but makes it more difficult for them to ramp up and down.  
Source: van Kooten and Timilsina (2009) 
 
Table 3: Energy Densities of Selected Energy Sources 
Energy Source 
Energy Density  
(W/m
2) 
Corn ethanol  <0.1 
Biomass-fuelled power plant  0.4  
Wind turbines  1.2  
Solar PV  6.7  
Small oil well (10 barrels/day)  27.0  
Average natural gas well (3300 m
3/day)  287.5  
Nuclear power plant
a  56.0  
a Based on a 4860 ha location in Texas, although the power plant 
occupies only a very small area within the property. 
Source: Bryce (2010, pp.91-93) 
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Biomass for generating electricity 
Increasing electrical power production from forest biomass, sawmill residue, and ‘black liquor’ 
from pulp mills is constrained by high transportation costs and competition for residual fiber, 
This makes forest biomass an expensive source of energy.  
Because of the extent of mountain pine beetle damage to forests in the interior of British 
Columbia, an obvious use of beetle-killed trees was considered to be power generation. While 
early studies suggested that this could be done without reliance on large feed-in tariffs (Kumar 
et al. 2008; Kumar 2009), later studies indicated that this optimistic conclusion was based on 
average past costs of harvesting and hauling timber from the forest to sawmills.
4
Producing char from biomass through a process known as pyrolysis (a form of incineration that 
chemically decomposes organic matter by heat without oxygen) suffers from similar problems, 
although high transportation costs might be mitigated somewhat by producing char on site. 
Nonetheless, the amount of char available for generating electricity will be negligible in 
comparison to what is needed and there are concerns that the process produces hazardous 
wastes. 
 Niquidet et al. 
(2010) found that, when account is taken of the rising costs of hauling timber as more remote 
timber damaged sites need to be harvested, marginal costs rise rapidly with truck cycle times 
(the time required to travel to and from the harvesting site). An electrical generating facility 
turns out to be only a marginally attractive option for reducing CO2 emissions when feedstock 
costs are low; but, as feedstock costs alone rise from an equivalent of 4¢/kWh to 8.5¢/kWh, 
biomass power is no longer an economically viable option.  
Perhaps the best option for generating electricity from wood biomass is wood pellets. Wood 
pellet production plants are relatively inexpensive to construct and can, in some instances, be 
moved quite easily to new locations (although they are not mobile enough to be located at the 
harvesting site). Wood pellets can be used directly in coal-fired power plants with little or no 
adjustments to the burners – pellets can be pulverized much like coal and pellets are preferred 
over wood chips (which are used for pulp).  
Because of their flexibility, relatively low production costs and government subsidy programs, 
demand for pellets has increased sharply. European demand for wood pellets has grown rapidly 
since about 2005 because of subsidies. As a result, British Columbia’s wood pellet production 
capacity has risen to about one million tons by 2010. But as demand for other energy uses of 
wood biomass increase, prices will rise.  
Using a regional fiber allocation and transportation model, Stennes et al. (2010) demonstrate a 
                                                      
4 Using average harvest and transportation data, Stennes and MacBeath (2006) found it was more 
economical to transport wood fiber from the BC interior to coal-fired power plants in Alberta than to 
construct a biomass power generating facility locally. The reason had to do with the adequacy of wood 
fiber supply over the life of a power plant, something that could have been addressed with a combined 
wood-coal fired plant.  Page | 9 
 
major drawback of timber feedstocks. As noted, hauling costs make it costly to employ timber 
for biomass generation of electricity. Indeed, in British Columbia and other jurisdictions where 
logging and hauling are important cost components of wood supply, wood residuals and other 
wood waste are available at a reasonable cost only as a result of timber harvests for sawmilling 
and production of lumber. Without lumber production, it is often too expensive to access 
biomass to support a bioenergy sector. In British Columbia, chips from sawmilling operations 
form the mainstay of the province’s pulp industry. Other sawmill residues (bark, sawdust, etc.) 
are already allocated by mills to on-site space heating and power generation, with some excess 
chips and residues used in the production of such things as wood pellets, oriented strand board 
and other products. Competition for sawmill residuals occurs between pulp mills and other 
wood product manufacturers as well as heating and electricity. While there is some leeway to 
increase available wood waste by hauling roadside and other waste from harvest operations to 
power generating facilities, competition for residual fiber raises prices. That is, when account is 
taken of the supply and demand of wood fiber for all its different purposes, there is little excess 
fiber available for generating power at reasonable cost. Feed-in tariffs and other subsidies for 
electricity production would harm existing users of fiber, such as pulp mills or wood pellet 
producers (Stennes et al. 2010). While pulp producers can out bid energy producers for wood 
fiber if pulp prices are high, they would have a harder time competing at lower prices for pulp, 
especially if bioenergy producers are subsidized. Thus, feed-in tariffs for biomass energy in a 
jurisdiction such as British Columbia might well be politically unacceptable.  
In other forest jurisdictions, there might be more leeway for fast-growing tree species to 
provide power, but similar problems are encountered. Competition for fiber implies that 
subsidies are required if the fiber is to be used for generating electricity. For example, the EU 
requires that 20% of total energy come from renewable sources by 2020, although only 7% 
came from renewable sources in 2009. To meet these targets, many countries will rely primarily 
on wind and energy from biomass. As a result, a wood deficit of 200 to 260 million m
3 is 
forecast for the EU by 2020, which is greater than Canada’s annual harvest. Globally, an 
ECE/FAO report estimates that there will be a wood deficit of 320 to 450 million m
3 annually 
simply to satisfy planned biomass energy needs plus a growing wood-based industry.
5
What is often neglected in discussions of biofuels and biomass-fired power generation is the 
fact that bioenergy is not carbon neutral as is often claimed. The combustion of biomass 
releases carbon dioxide, more than that released from fossils fuels to generate an equivalent 
amount of energy. It is only when plants and trees grow that CO2 is removed from the 
atmosphere, and this can take quite a long time in the case of trees. The timing of CO2 
emissions and sequestration matters; if CO2 released by burning takes 20 years to be 
sequestered, for example, there is a penalty associated with the early contribution of CO2 to 
global warming (van Kooten 2009).  
 Global 
wood fiber prices will certainly increase, resulting in potentially detrimental changes in land use 
(see below). 
                                                      
5 Results reported by Don Roberts, CIBC, in presentations given in early 2010. Page | 10 
 
Further, greenhouse gas emissions related to harvests and hauling, and nitrogen fertilizers, may 
offset any CO2 benefits of biomass as a fuel (Crutzen et al. 2008). Finally, using biomass for 
energy can result in land-use changes that largely offset gains from burning biomass in lieu of 
fossil fuels (Searchinger et al. 2008, 2009). More CO2 is released in gathering biomass across a 
large landscape than is the case with coal, for example, as coal deposits are concentrated near 
a particular location. To mitigate the time that trees take to grow (upwards of 80 years), fast-
growing tree species such as hybrid poplar or plants such as switchgrass can be used. While this 
tilts emissions more favorably towards use of biomass, nitrogen fertilizer is often required to 
spur growth, and nitrogen oxides are a more potent greenhouse gas than CO2.  
From a policy perspective, energy crops (including trees) are not an efficient means of 
addressing climate change, although there may be potential to source energy from various 
biological organisms in the future. However, energy from biological organisms does not appear 
to be a major component of governments’ policy arsenals for combating climate change. 
Landfill gas generated from solid waste is also a potential source of electricity, but even if it is 
employed on a large scale, its contribution to the globe’s electricity needs would necessarily be 
extremely small. The same holds for the incineration of municipal wastes. 
Hydraulics, Storage and Run-of-River Hydro 
A number of countries have developed their hydraulic resources to build large-scale 
hydropower facilities. With the so-called ‘three gorges’ dam (affecting the Upper Mekong, 
Yangtze and Salween Rivers), China now has the greatest hydro capacity in the world (Table 4). 
In 2007, hydro production only accounted for 14.8% of China’s consumption of electricity. This 
is much less than the proportions accounted for by hydro in Norway (98%), Brazil (84%), 
Venezuela (72%) and Canada (57%). India relied on hydropower to a greater extent than China, 
as did Russia despite its relatively abundant fossil fuel resources.   
Large-scale hydro remains one of the best options for generating ‘clean’ electricity, but its main 
drawbacks relate to inadequate runoff for power generation (especially in regions where water 
is scarce, intermittent and/or unreliable) and negative environmental externalities (changes in 
the aquatic ecosystem, impediments to fish migration, land inundation by reservoirs, etc.). 
Environmentalists oppose large-scale hydro development, particularly in developing countries 
because of the ecological damage it causes, while even small-scale, run-of-river projects have 
been opposed in rich countries on environmental grounds. Because of strong environmental 
opposition against hydropower developments, hydropower’s future contribution to increases in 
overall generating capacity will inevitably remain limited in scope. Expansion of water power is 
not expected to be a large contributor to the mitigation of climate change. Page | 11 
 







% of domestic 
consumption 
China  485  126  14.8 
Brazil  374  73  84.0 
Canada  369  73  57.6 
United States  276  99  6.3 
Russia  179  46  17.6 
Norway  135  29  98.2 
India  124  35  15.4 
Japan  84  47  7.4 
Venezuela  83  n.a.  72.3 
Sweden  66  n.a.  44.5 
Rest of World  987  n.a.  n.a. 
WORLD  3162  889  15.9 
a Data for 2006 
n.a. not available 
Source: International Energy Agency (2010b) 
Although unlikely to contribute much in the way of additional clean power, existing large-scale 
hydro and strategic expansions of reservoir storage capacity (which raise generating capacity) 
might serve an important purpose when combined with intermittent sources of energy, 
particularly wind and solar sources. For example, wind-generated power is often available at 
night, when base-load power plants are able to supply all demand. Wind energy would then 
need to be curtailed (wasted) or, where possible (and it may not always be possible), base-load 
plants would need to reduce output, causing them to operate inefficiently. If a base-load plant 
is coal fired, inefficient operation implies that CO2 emissions are not reduced one-for-one as 
wind replaces coal. In some cases, the tradeoff is so poor that CO2 emissions are hardly reduced 
whatsoever. This problem can be overcome if adequate transmission capacity exists so that the 
excess wind-generated power could be stored behind hydro dams by displacing electricity 
demand met by hydropower. This is the case in northern Europe, where excess wind power 
generated at night in Denmark is exported to Norway, with hydropower imported from Norway 
during peak daytime hours.  
Similar relationships are found elsewhere. In Canada, for example, the provinces of Quebec and 
British Columbia rely almost exclusively on hydropower, while the respective neighboring 
provinces of Ontario and Alberta generate significant base-load power from coal (or nuclear in 
Ontario’s case). Ontario and Alberta are both expanding their installed wind capacity. During 
nighttime, off-peak hours, excess wind and/or base-load power from Ontario (Alberta) is sold to 
Quebec (British Columbia), with hydropower sold back during peak periods. Given that the 
rents from these transactions have accrued to the provinces with hydro assets, Ontario and 
Alberta have been less than keen to upgrade the transmission interties, preferring to look at 
other possible solutions to the intermittency and/or storage problems. Page | 12 
 
In all three cases, there are net economic and climate benefits from the development of higher 
capacity transmission interties; or, in the case of northern Europe, simply more interties 
between jurisdictions where wind power is generated (northern Germany, other parts of 
Denmark) and those with hydro resources (Norway and Sweden). The main obstacle is the lack 
of incentives for the wind-generating region to ‘dump’ power into the region with storage, as 
the latter captures all the rents from such an exchange. This is a game theory problem: If 
institutions can be developed that facilitate the sharing of both the economic rents and the 
climate benefits (emission reduction credits), the jurisdictions have the incentive to better 
integrate the operations of their electricity grids (including construction or upgrading of 
transmission interties) so that overall CO2 emissions are minimized.  
Wind and Solar Energy: Generating Electricity from Intermittent Energy Sources 
There exists a number of promising renewable energy sources that could at some time in the 
future make a significant contribution to global electrical energy needs. However, the likelihood 
that these will have a major impact in the short or medium term (five to 50 years) is small. It is 
evident from Figure 1 that non-conventional sources of energy constitute only about 3% of 
global electricity production. Raising that to 20% or more constitutes an enormous challenge, 
especially in a world where energy demand is rapidly increasing as a result of economic 
development in countries such as India and China. Simply expanding the use of renewable 
energy and then incorporating renewable energy sources into energy systems will prove 
difficult, not least because an expansion in the use of renewables will lead to increases in their 
prices (as we noted with regard to wood biomass). 
Among alternative energy sources, solar and wind energy are especially promising. The energy 
or irradiance from the sun averages some 1.366 kW/m
2, or 174 PW for the entire globe, but it is 
difficult to convert to usable energy. Other than through plant photosynthesis, there are two 
ways to harness this solar energy: (1) solar photovoltaic (PV) converts the sun’s energy directly 
into electricity, while (2) solar heaters provide energy to warm a fluid such as water (swimming 
pools, water tanks, etc.). Solar heaters convert up to 60% of the sun’s energy into heat, while 
PV cells convert only 12% to 15% of the energy into electricity, although PV laboratory 
prototypes are reaching 30% efficiency. One problem with solar electricity is its prohibitive 
capital costs, which amount to some $13,000 to $15,000 per kilowatt (kW) of installed capacity 
(IEA 2005; also see Table 2), although costs have fallen in the past several years. In addition, 
solar power is intermittent (e.g., output is greatly reduced on cloudy days), unavailable at night, 
and, in high latitudes, less available in winter when demand is high than in summer (due to 
shorter days). Nonetheless, for remote locations that receive plenty of sunshine and are not 
connected to an electrical grid, the costs of constructing transmission lines to bring in outside 
power might make solar PV and solar heaters a viable option.  
Given the current drawbacks of many other renewable sources of energy, wind energy appears 
to be the renewable alternative of choice when it comes to the generation of electricity. As a 
result, global wind generating capacity has expanded rapidly from only 10 megawatts (MW) of 
installed capacity in 1980 to 157,899 MW by the end of 2009, an average annual rate of Page | 13 
 
increase of some 49% (GWEC 2010). Such a high average annual rate of increase is a result of 
starting from a low base, and is driven largely by feed-in tariffs and other government 
incentives.  
ECONOMICS OF FEED-IN TARIFFS 
Because electricity can be produced from any conceivable source of energy, renewable sources 
of energy can most easily be integrated into an economy through the electricity grid. 
Consequently, many jurisdictions have set renewable electricity targets, using regulation, feed-
in tariffs or other forms of subsidy to encourage the generation of electricity from non fossil 
fuel, non-nuclear sources. Regulation takes the form of mandates, the best examples of which 
are renewable electricity standards that require electrical utilities to produce some proportion 
of their power from renewable sources by certain dates. Such requirements are being adopted 
in many developed countries, with some even having mandated the elimination of all coal fired 
power plants.  
With the exception of biomass, which has its own demons, wind, solar, run-of-river, wave and 




 This has serious complications for the way that electricity markets operate. In this 
section, we consider this complication in more detail as it pertains to feed-in tariffs (FITs). While 
the focus is on intermittent energy sources, some of the discussion also applies to FITs for 
biomass or, for that matter, diesel and other forms of power generation. 
If the prices consumers pay for electricity are fixed, the demand function is essentially a vertical 
line – demand for electricity is completely inelastic and does not respond to changes in 
wholesale prices. Time-of-use pricing at the retail level affects demand directly (giving the 
vertical demand function a downward slope), but to implement time-of-use pricing requires a 
‘smart grid’ – something beyond just smart meters. Smart meters can only detect how much 
electricity a customer uses at each time of the day; a smart grid enables the customer to adjust 
electricity use in response of price changes. Thus, smart meters can be used to implement a 
tiered pricing scheme (such as daytime and nighttime pricing differentials), which can tilt the 
demand curve slightly; the smart grid enables off-site control of large appliances in response to 
changing prices.  
Even if some degree of real time pricing can be implemented, it is likely that the demand for 
electricity will remain highly inelastic. Based on cross-section and time series analyses, the 
short-run elasticity of demand is about –0.3 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2010, 
                                                      
6 The capacity factor of a generator refers to the actual power output over a period compared to what it 
could potentially produce. For example, a 2 MW capacity wind turbine could conceivably produce 17.52 
GWh of electricity in one year (= 2 MW × 8760 hours). But this depends on perfect wind conditions. With 
variable wind, the turbine might only produce 4,200 MWh, and its capacity factor would be 24.0%. The 
capacity factor of a base-load, coal-fired power plant, on the other hand, might be 85% or more. Page | 14 
 
p.26), while it is between –1.5 and –0.5 in the long run.
7
To examine the supply side, assume an electricity system that is deregulated at the wholesale 
level. The electricity system operator (ESO) requires owners of generating facilities to commit 
to produce electricity at a given hour one day (24 hours) ahead of actual delivery. Each 
generator will offer to produce a certain amount of electricity at a particular price, knowing that 
the final price received is the market-clearing price for that hour. In essence, a power plant will 
offer units of electricity at a single price (or variety of prices if costs of producing electricity 
differ across units) to be produced and delivered on a specified hour the next day. This is known 
as day ahead, unit commitment. Of course, as the hour approaches for which an owner of a 
generating facility has committed to supply power more information about the status of 
generators and the evolution of prices becomes known. Therefore, generators are able to make 
changes to their offers up to two hours before delivery. The extent of permitted changes is 
increasingly constrained by penalties as the hour nears. 
 This implies that a 1% increase in the 
price of electricity results in a 0.3% reduction in demand in the short run, and a reduction of 
0.5% to 1.5% in the long run.  
What do the offers to supply electricity look like? Base load nuclear and coal-fired power plants, 
and for some grids base-load hydropower dams, will bid in lowest. Indeed, for base-load 
facilities that cannot readily change their power output, or can do so only at high cost, the 
optimal strategy is to provide very low (even zero) price bids to ensure that they can deliver 
power to the grid. Open-cycle, natural gas peaking plants will want to bid in at their true 
marginal cost of production, which is essentially determined by the price they have to pay for 
fuel. The facilities that provide the highest bids are those that wish to export electricity to 
another system, regardless of the energy source used to generate the power; by setting their 
price high, their output is unlikely to be chosen by the system operator and can thus be 
exported. (Importers will want to set their prices low to guarantee that the imported power will 
be chosen.) In between the extreme prices are found a variety of generating facilities, such as 
biomass plants, combined-cycle gas plants (CCGT), and sub-units of extant plants that are at 
different levels of readiness, maintenance, et cetera. Once the ESO has all of the information 
regarding the amounts of electricity that the various components of the generating system are 
willing to supply, and their associated prices, a market merit order is developed to allocate 
power across the generators depending on demand. An example is provided in Figure 2. 
In Figure 2, the supply curve is given by the market order. Base-load nuclear and coal facilities 
bid in at the lowest price, followed by CCGT and other generating facilities as indicated.
8
                                                      
7 Price elasticities between 0 and –1 indicate inelastic demand. In a meta-regression analysis of studies 
of U.S. residential demand for electricty, Espey and Espey (2004) concluded that the best estimates of 
short-run and long-run elasticities were –0.28 and –0.81, respectively.  
 The 
market clearing price is determined by the location of the demand curve at that hour. Assuming 
8 CCGT power plants are often base-load facilities but they have a little more wiggle room in ramping 
production than base-load coal and nuclear power plants. The reason is that available heat from the fuel 
can be adjusted quicker for gas than coal or nuclear fuel rods. Likewise, biomass fueled plants are often 
base-load; only their capacity tends to be much smaller than that of coal, nuclear and CCGT plants. Page | 15 
 
the demand curve on the right, the market price P is given by the marginal open-cycle natural 
gas plant (NG 2). If the transmission infrastructure somehow impedes NG 2 (or some other 
plant) from delivering power, then NG 3 determines the market clearing price, which becomes 
P′. All generators get paid P for the period in question (or P′ if transmission capacity results in 
NG 3 coming on line instead of some other generator).  
 
Figure 2: Market Merit Order 
Base-load facilities bid in at zero price to avoid incurring the high costs of curtailing output, but 
also knowing they will receive P or P′. If the demand curve is D* then the wholesale price is zero 
and only base-load facilities generate electricity. Assuming that investments in base-load 
capacity were determined from the load duration curve, demand would never be less than D*, 
with q* representing the system’s minimum load. To reiterate, base-load plants would bid in at 
a zero price despite potentially earning no revenue; this is to avoid high costs of ramping 
production or, worse, dumping power in an emergency-like situation (i.e., instantaneously 
reducing pressure in the boiler).  
Suppose a feed-in tariff for biomass-generated power increased biomass generating capacity. In 
terms of Figure 2, biomass would drop in the merit order because of the subsidy and more 
would be available. This could result in moving CCGT 2 or even CCGT 1 and CCGT 2 ‘higher up’ in 
the merit order – essentially the bid prices would remain the same but biomass will be chosen 
before these generating sources. All other generators would be chosen later in the merit order, 
with NG 1 or even ‘coal 1’ becoming the marginal power plant. Price of electricity would fall, 
ceteris paribus. If biomass generation becomes base load, it will be necessary to displace some 
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there may be constraints on wood fiber availability. 
The picture changes completely when wind, solar, run-of-river or other variable generating 
capacity is introduced into the electricity system as a result of a feed-in tariff. The situation can 
be illustrated with the aid of Figure 3. The only difference between Figures 2 and 3 is the 
addition of q*q
0 electricity from variable generating sources (hereafter referred to as wind). 
This shifts the supply curve in Figure 2 to the right by amount q*q
0. Now, with the original 
demand curve (the one on the right in Figure 3), it is no longer NG 2 that is the marginal 
producer of electricity; rather, it is the plant with a lower marginal cost, NG 1. The market 
clearing price of electricity for that hour falls from P to P
F. The feed-in tariff lowers the price of 
electricity, which will induce consumers to purchase more of it (as indicated by the arrow). 
 
Figure 3: Market Merit Order 
What does one do with the wind energy q*q
0 if the demand in a given hour is D*? Clearly, 
either the wind must be curtailed (wasted) or base-load output reduced. Base-load hydropower 
can easily be reduced, as discussed below, so consider only a system with base-load thermal 
generating capacity. If q*q
0 could be reliably produced in every period, so it can be considered 
part of the base load, then some coal or nuclear base-load capacity becomes redundant and 
can be eliminated – an ideal outcome.
9
                                                      
9 Of course, with concern about climate change, the optimal solution would be to reduce coal-fired 
capacity.  
 However, wind generated power is not reliable and thus 
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Suppose base-load capacity is reduced by the amount q*q
0. Then, whenever wind power is less 
than q*q
0, this is the same as shifting the supply curve in Figure 2 to the left, which would raise 
the market price for every hour that wind is less than q*q
0, while lowering price if wind output 
exceeds q*q
0. Thus, the effect of a feed-in tariff for wind (or solar, wave, tidal, etc.) is to 
increase price volatility if thermal base-load capacity is driven from the system;
10
The situation is somewhat different in a system with significant hydropower generating 
capacity, because hydropower can provide base-load power and serve the peak load and 
reserve markets. The presence of significant hydro capacity enables a system to absorb wind 
power that might overwhelm the ability of a system with a high thermal capacity in the 
generating mix to absorb it, or raise system costs by too much in doing so. That is, the existence 
of hydro reservoirs enables a system to store wind energy that would be wasted in systems 
lacking hydro generating capacity in the mix. However, there must be times when this stored 
wind energy is required to meet load, perhaps at peak load times.  
 if thermal 
base-load capacity is not driven from the system, electricity prices will generally be lower, but 
base-load plants will need to ramp up or down if wind energy is non-dispatchable (i.e., 
considered to be ‘must run’), which will increase their operating costs (van Kooten 2010). 
Alternatively, if wind is considered dispatchable, wind will need to be curtailed or wasted. 
Because demand and supply of electricity must balance at all times, there is one further aspect 
to electricity markets and that is the need for operating reserves. These consist of regulating 
reserves that adjust supply continually to meet small changes in demand (load) and supply over 
a time frame of several seconds to 10-15 minutes. Thermal power plants have the ability to 
adjust output very quickly over a small range in less than a minute. Some open-cycle gas and 
diesel generators are operating below capacity or on stand-by and, by adjusting the fuel 
received (in essence apply more or less pressure to the ‘gas pedal’), can readily adjust output. 
Some generators will simply be idling in standby mode, not delivering electricity to the grid; 
these are referred to as ‘spinning reserve,’ as distinguished from units that are operating below 
capacity. For example, generator NG 1 in Figure 3 is not operating at full capacity and can easily 
adjust supply (e.g., by the amount indicated by the arrow). 
Storage devices, such as batteries and flywheels, might also be used in a regulatory capacity, as 
might hydropower. Automated generation control, which is also known as regulation, is used to 
manage small fluctuations in the supply-load balance. 
Contingency reserves, on the other hand, are required to meet a situation where power from 
any given generator is suddenly lost for whatever reason. They are designed to handle 
emergencies – the contingency that a power plant goes ‘off line’ and is unable to provide the 
electricity that it had committed. For example, the Western Electricity Coordinating Council 
                                                      
10  Using a grid model, this is precisely what a major European consulting firm found: As installed 
European wind capacity increased to the levels required to meet 2020 renewable energy targets in 
electricity, wholesale prices fluctuated wildly, making investments in electrical generating capacity 
riskier (see Pöyry 2011). This conclusion held even if transmission interties and capacity increased to 
facilitate wind entering a Europe-wide grid.  Page | 18 
 
(WECC) requires that contingency reserves be sufficient to cover the most severe potential loss 




 The market for contingency reserves is indicated in Figure 4.  
Figure 4: Market for Ancillary Contingent Reserves 
Suppose that the merit-order demand for contingency reserves in a given hour is denoted D
C, 
which is determined by the conditions set out by WECC. The various units bid their reserves 
much like they do in the establishment of the merit order in Figure 2, although the bid also 
includes a capacity payment needed to maintain the reserve position. If the offer is accepted, 
the capacity payment would be made by the ISO regardless of whether any power was 
dispatched to the grid. 
In the ancillary market, the open-cycle and diesel peakers will now want to bid in at a low price 
because they are the ones that can get off the mark the quickest. Likewise, the bid price of the 
hydro contingent reserves will be low, perhaps even zero (in which case they obtain the 
marginal market clearing price P in Figure 2), but the prices bid by peakers NG 3 and Diesel 1 
will also be low because they know that, when there is a demand for ancillary services, they will 
receive at least the price determined by the marginal generator (NG 2 in Figure 2) plus their 
own bid in the ancillary market. Base-load plants, on the other hand, will bid in very high, if at 
all, because they can only ramp up output at great expense. The actual bid price will depend on 
the strategy of the owners of the various units, which would depend on the anticipated state of 
the units at the time. A market for ancillary contingent reserves is established in a fashion 
similar to that of the real-time market, except that units will also receive a capacity payment for 
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their reserve position, while receiving the market clearing price for any electricity they are 
asked to dispatch.  
In the previous discussion of intermittent renewable sources of energy, it was assumed that 
wind output was predictable. When wind enters an electricity system, however, there is a real 
risk that output from this source falls (or rises) dramatically and unexpectedly during the course 
of an hour. This means that the system operator must not only meet its normal reserve 
requirements (e.g., as set out by the WECC), but must also have additional regulating and 
contingency reserves that address the variability in wind. In terms of Figure 4, this is seen by 
the shift of demand for contingent reserves from D
C to D
C′. When wind capacity is installed, 
contingency reserves could increase by upwards of 10% and regulating reserves by even more 
(Gross et al. 2006, 2007). This often requires additional investments in operating reserves of 
various types. 
The additional costs of reserves must be added to the operating costs that intermittent energy 
imposes on an electricity grid. These are well documented and consist of costs related to more 
frequent ramping up and down of base-load facilities, operating power plants below their 
optimal operating range, and more frequent stops and starts of diesel and gas peaking 
generators (Maddaloni et al. 2008; Prescott and van Kooten 2009; van Kooten 2010; le Pair and 
de Groot 2010). 
THE REAL WORLD OF FEED-IN TARIFFS 
Although many jurisdictions provide direct subsidies to the construction of renewable electrical 
generating facilities, transmission lines and R&D related to generation of electricity from wind, 
solar and other sources, they have also implemented feed-in tariffs (FITs) as an incentive to 
increase power generation from various renewable sources. FITs guarantee developers of 
renewable generating capacity a preferred price for any power they deliver to the grid. For 
example, if the market price of electricity is $0.10 per kilowatt hour (kWh), the FIT might be 
$0.15 per kWh, which amounts to a subsidy of $0.05 per kWh. The supplier of renewable power 
is often guaranteed the higher rate for a period of five or more years. Along with the FIT, the 
authority might also have to guarantee the renewable generator of power access to the grid 
through newly-constructed or extant transmission lines. 
While subsidies might help in the short run, they are not sustainable in the long run because 
they distort production decisions resulting in inefficiencies. Suppose only some countries 
provide FITs that result in greater reliance on wind and solar energy, thereby displacing fossil 
fuels in power generation. This does not mean that the fossil fuels are no longer burned. After 
all, the mining of fossil fuels creates economic rents that owners will continue to exploit.  Thus, 
for example, eliminating coal power in the United States does not necessarily prevent the 
mining of coal and its sale to China, India or elsewhere to be burned for power generation. If 
the U.S. were to close its coal-fired power plants, owners of coal mines in Appalachia would 
more than likely sell coal overseas for the production of electricity (The Economist, January 29, 
2011, pp.64-65). Indeed, curtailing coal use in the U.S. and Europe could reduce global coal Page | 20 
 
prices, at least in the short term. This gives countries that continue to rely on fossil fuels to use 
coal less efficiently, and lead overseas power producers to invest more in coal-fired capacity 
than they would otherwise. Once such investments have been made, it could be 40 or more 
years before such capacity becomes redundant. In this manner, the climate benefits of the 
original subsidies are offset. 
As we will see, FIT programs are primarily but not exclusively a rich country phenomenon. 
Given that developing countries are increasing electricity output from all sources, feed-in tariffs 
and other subsidies in some of those countries are used to encourage investments in all forms 
of power generation, as the desire is for more electrical generating capacity and not for 
renewable power per se. Thus, it is FIT program benefits in rich countries that are inevitably 
countered to some extent by rising CO2 emissions in developing countries, which is due to their 
improved access to fossil fuels. This is one aspect of the 'rebound effect' – the offsetting 
increase in emissions that accompany programs designed to reduce emissions in the first place 
(Jenkins et al. 2011). 
Existing Feed-in Tariff Programs: A Comparison
12
Many countries employ feed-in tariffs as a means of encouraging private development of 
renewable generating capacity. In Table 5, we summarize the extent of FIT programs for wind 
projects in various jurisdictions. The Ontario FIT program that is discussed in the next 
subsection is one of the more lucrative programs, paying the highest tariffs for large on-shore 
and off-shore projects. The only exceptions are South Africa for off-shore projects and Germany 
for on-shore projects but then only as a bonus if a wind project is grid compatible (so there is 
no need for increasing transmission line capacity). As indicated in the Appendix, there are many 
other jurisdictions that offer FITs for wind power generation, but the scale of projects is limited 
to at most 10 MW, with 500 kW a more frequent maximum. A 10 MW project constitutes 
perhaps five large wind turbines or 40 very small turbines. In some countries, FIT payments are 
of short duration and programs are subject to arbitrary cancelation. An indication of the extent 
to which small wind projects are subsidized in various places is provided in the lower half of 
Table 5.  
 
Feed-in tariffs for solar photovoltaic (PV) are much larger than those for wind power as 
indicated in Table 6. Again Ontario's feed-in tariffs for solar power are the most lucrative. The 
State of Washington is the only jurisdiction to offer more money to solar power producers, but 
only if the solar panels are manufactured within the state. 
Many other countries offer feed-in tariffs to producers of electricity generated from wind, 
hydro, solar, biomass, and even geothermal, tidal and wave sources. A list of countries 
providing FITs for the main renewable energy sources is provided in the Appendix. It should be 
                                                      
12  All values provided below have been converted to a Canadian dollar basis by Paul Gipe (see 
http://www.wind-works.org/articles/feed_laws.html); during the first quarter of 2011, the Canadian 
dollar has been trading at slightly above par against the U.S. dollar. An exchange rate of 1€ = 1.33878 $C 
is assumed. Page | 21 
 
noted, however, that power producers employing renewable energy are not the only ones to 
benefit from FITs. In Tanzania, for example, producers of diesel-generated electricity in rural 
areas are eligible for a feed-in tariff of $0.253/kWh, while small power producers in general 
receive between $0.068 and $0.091 per kWh depending on the season, with power provided 
during the dry season receiving a premium. In all cases, contract lengths for FITs in Tanzania are 
15 years. 
Table 5: Feed-in Tariffs for On-shore and Off-shore Wind Projects, 
including Length of Programs, Various Jurisdictions, As of November 
2010 (Values in Canadian $) 
Jurisdiction  Years  $/kWh 
Large-scale Off-shore Wind 
    Germany (without bonus) 





France  15  0.174 
Ontario  20  0.190 
Large-scale On-shore Wind 
    Germany  20  0.123 
Ontario  20  0.135 
France  15  0.110 
Spain  25  0.105 
South Africa  20  0.179 
Vermont  20  0.128 
Small On-shore Wind Projects (examples) 
    Portugal <3.68 kW (Microgenerator)  15  0.578 
Britain 1.5 kW-15 kW  20  0.424 
Britain >15 kW<100 kW  20  0.383 
Italy <200 kW  15  0.402 
Israel <15 kW  20  0.347 
Israel <50 kW  20  0.444 
Switzerland <10 kW  20  0.204 
Vermont <15 kW  20  0.204 
Washington State Out of State  6  0.123 
Washington State Fully in State  6  0.419 
Wisconsin, Xcel Energy  10  0.067 
Wisconsin, Madison Gas & Electric  10  0.062 
Indianapolis Power & Light >50 kW<100 kW  10  0.143 
NOTES: 
Source: Calculations made by Paul Gipe, Bakersfield, CA. Available at: 
http://www.wind-works.org/articles/feed_laws.html 
Assumed exchange rate: 1€ = 1.33878 $C 
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Table 6: Feed-in Tariffs for Solar  Photovoltaic, including Length of 
Programs, Various Jurisdictions, As of November 2010 (Canadian $) 
Jurisdiction  Application  Years  $/kWh 
Italy
a  Rooftop small  20  0.524 
 
Rooftop large  20  0.443 
 
Ground-mounted small  20  0.465 
 
Ground-mounted large  20  0.368 
South Korea  >3 kW  15  0.758 
India  < 1 MW  25  0.435 
France   Building Integrated  20  0.562 
Germany
b  Rooftop small (<30 KW)  20  0.576 
 
Rooftop large (> 1 MW)  30  0.442 
 
Ground mounted  20  0.428 
Czech Republic 
 
15  0.664 
Spain (2007 RD)  <100 kW  15  0.455 
Austria  <5 kW  12  0.616 
Ontario 
 
20  0.802 
Washington State
c  Manufactured in state  8  1.175 
California
c  Commercial  5  0.673 
South Australia
c  Residential  5  0.431 
NOTES: 
a After May 2011, but declining by 6% beginning in 2012 
b Data for 2009.  
c Form of net-metering 
Source: Calculations made by Paul Gipe, Bakersfield, CA. Available at: 
http://www.wind-works.org/articles/feed_laws.html 
Assumed exchange rate: 1€ = 1.33878 $C  
Some countries are now rethinking their FIT structures. For example, Germany's FITs for 
rooftop solar PV have fallen in 2011 to $0.385/kWh for units with a capacity less than 30 kW 
and to $0.290/kWh for units with a capacity greater than 1 MW, while tariffs for freestanding 
units have been reduced to $0.296/kWh. At the same time, the length of the German FIT 
program for large-scale rooftop PV has been reduced from 30 to 20 years. The German 
government is in discussions with solar power producers to reduce FITs even further because  
"consumer energy prices for those not using photovoltaic have risen noticeably to 
cover the subsidy costs for those using solar energy. ... [The government] is facing 
growing resistance from non-solar electricity bill payers. Energy providers also have 
difficulties incorporating any surplus solar power into their networks, as almost half 
the world's solar panels are mounted on German roofs, and not linked directly to the 
grid."
13
                                                      
13 Article in Earth Times entitled “German solar power producers agree to subsidy cuts” available at: 
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The Netherlands is reconsidering its feed-in tariffs for wind power because it is finding that the 
rebound effect offsets too much of the presumed reduction in CO2 emissions (see Jenkins et al. 
2011). In essence, the installation of wind, run-of-river hydro and solar energy capacity does 
not result in a one-to-one reduction in fossil fuel capacity, nor is there a one-to-one reduction 
in CO2 emissions for each kW of wind that replaces a kW of fossil fuel generated power. The 
reasons are well known. With energy sources that are intermittent or erratic, traditional 
thermal generating facilities cannot be taken off line; rather, they often produce below their 
optimal efficient operating range, requiring more fuel and releasing more CO2 per unit of 
output. Even if large-scale storage is available (e.g., hydro reservoirs), it cannot always prevent 
a rebound effect. And, as noted earlier, when it comes to burning biomass for electricity, there 
may be little in the way of CO2 savings. 
It is not the rebound effect that is the main problem, however. Rather, it is the backlash from 
electricity consumers that is causing governments to rethink feed-in tariffs. Lucrative feed-in 
tariffs lead to high electricity rates because someone must eventually pay for the subsidization 
of higher cost alternatives for generating electricity – pay the costs of reducing CO2 emissions. 
The problem with FITs is that the authority chooses the technology to be used for reducing CO2 
emissions, and such choices have a social cost. Alternative technologies might be de-
emphasized or overlooked, unanticipated costs related to the existing generating mix and 
transmission constraints may have been ignored, and externalities may have been disregarded 
(e.g., transmission lines from a wind site to a load center may need to bypass a wilderness area 
thereby greatly increasing costs). Often the authority bears these costs because it has done 
more than simply provide a FIT: It has also guaranteed access to transmission lines. As a result, 
the costs of generating electricity are higher than the amount of the subsidy, which equals the 
FIT minus the market price, and reductions in CO2 emissions are lower than anticipated, 
sometimes much lower. Further, the FITs lock the authority into long-term payments as 
contracts average 20 years and tariffs ratchet upwards as a result of inflation clauses. 
Feed-in Tariffs: The Case of Ontario 
The province of Ontario is committed to reducing its reliance on thermal generation of 
electricity, especially coal and nuclear. It aims to eliminate coal-fired power generation and, 
perhaps (especially in light of events in Japan in March 2011), nuclear generation as well. For 
these reasons and because electricity grids have their own peculiar dynamics, it has chosen to 
rely on feed-in tariffs over mandated levels of renewable energy use. Therefore, as noted 
above, the Ontario government launched one of the most ambitious attempts to affect power 
generation from renewable sources when it passed the Green Energy and Green Economy Act 
on May 14, 2009. The FIT schedule under the Act is provided in Table 7. The important thing to 
note about the FIT schedule is that feed-in tariffs are indexed to inflation, with the exception of 
solar power. Solar power is not indexed to inflation because the subsidy is high to begin with 
and prices of solar panels are expected to fall dramatically in the future.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/news/363164,producers-agree-subsidy-cuts.html (viewed March 
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Table 7: Ontario Power Authority’s Feed-in Tariff (FIT) Program for Renewable Energy 
Projects, Base Date: September 30, 2009  








Biomass       
  ≤ 10 MW 





Landfill gas       
  ≤ 10 MW 





Biogas       
  on-farm  ≤ 100 kW  19.5  20% 
  on-farm  > 100 kW, ≤ 250 kW  18.5  20% 
  biogas  ≤ 500 kW  16.0  20% 
  biogas  > 500 kW, ≤ 10 MW  14.7  20% 
  biogas  > 10 MW  12.2  20% 
Wind       
  on-shore 







Solar       
  roof/ground 
  roof top 
  roof top 
  roof top 
  ground mount 
≤ 10 kW 
> 10 kW, ≤ 250 kW 
> 250 kW, ≤ 500 kW 
> 500 kW 












a       
  ≤ 10 MW 






a Performance factor: 1.35 peak, 0.90 off peak. 
b Generally a 20-year contract with 2-3 year lead time; for hydro, 40 year contracts 
c Indexed by the Ontario CPI 
Source: (viewed April 21, 2010) 
http://fit.powerauthority.on.ca/Storage/99/10863_FIT_Pricing_Schedule_for_website.pdf 
There is a significant feed-in tariff for electricity produced from biomass as the government 
seeks to replace coal-fired power with wood pellets.
14
                                                      
14 Wood pellets are easy to transport and can readily be used in lieu of coal in power plants; wood pellet 
production facilities are also simple to construct, and require relatively little capital investment. 
 For biomass generators exceeding 10 
MW capacity the FIT is 13.0¢/kWh, while it is 13.8¢/kWh for smaller generators. Contracts are 
20 years in length and tariffs are indexed to the Ontario Consumer Price Index. The tariff is also 
increased by a factor of 1.35 during peak hours (7:00AM to 11:00AM and 5:00PM to 9:00PM), 
but reduced by 0.90 for all off-peak hours. Already wood producers in British Columbia and 
Ontario are investing in wood pellet production for domestic use and export (see Stennes et al. 
2010).  Page | 25 
 
The potential size of the subsidies associated with Ontario’s FIT program can be determined 
from information about electricity rates. Residential customers with smart meters pay 9.9¢ per 
kWh at peak times, 8.0¢/kWh during mid-peak periods (11:00AM to 5:00PM) and 5.3¢/kWh 
during off-peak times (9:00PM to 7:00AM). Customers without smart meters pay 6.5¢/kWh for 
the first 600 kWh (in summer the first 1000 kWh) and 7.5¢/kWh thereafter.  
Ontario’s average electrical load was some 16,000 MW during 2007, although it has fallen 
somewhat since then as a result of the financial crisis, which caused some major demanders of 
power to shut down. Coal and gas generating capacities are both about 4000 MW; nuclear 
generating capacity amounts to some 10,000 MW, while hydro capacity is nearly 6000 MW. To 
provide some indication of the costs and benefits of Ontario’s FIT program, assume that only 
30% of the load is satisfied by fossil fuels, or 4800 MW per hour, and the objective is to 
eliminate that production. Further, assume that, despite the capacities of coal and natural gas 
generation, coal-generated power accounts for half or more of fossil fuel generated power. 
Finally, assume that biomass and wind generated power substitute for fossil fuel power – 
biomass accounts for either half or one-quarter of the required substitute power with on-shore 
and off-shore wind accounting for two-thirds and one-third, respectively, of the remainder. 
For every metric ton (t) of coal that is burned, 7506 kWh of energy are generated and 2.735 
tonnes of CO2 are released.
15
The costs to the government of the FIT program depend on the extent to which various 
renewables substitute for fossil fuel generation and the average amount that final consumers 
pay for electricity. In Table 8, it is assumed that consumers pay an average of 8.5¢/kWh. Using 
various biomass and wind combinations and fossil fuel displacement scenarios, and FIT data 
from Table 7, it is possible to calculate carbon fluxes and costs to the public treasury of 
reducing CO2 emissions. Results provided in Table 8 suggest that costs to the treasury could 
amount to $2.4-$2.6 billion annually, which will put a severe strain on the provincial treasury. In 
essence, by substituting fossil fuel energy with renewable sources in the generation of 
electricity, Ontario will pay a subsidy ranging from some $45 per tCO2 to well over $1000 
depending primarily on the extent of biomass generation. Greater reliance on biomass 
compared to wind leads to higher costs. 
 Thus, it takes 320 tons of coal to burn half of the 4800 MWh of 
electricity supplied by coal-fired generation, releasing 874.6 tCO2 hourly or 7.660 Gt CO2 per 
year. At the same time, natural gas plants will release 495.8 tCO2 each hour or 4.343 Gt of CO2 
annually if they generate 2400 MW of electricity each hour. 
Several points are worth mentioning. First, there exist much cheaper ways to reduce CO2 
emissions, including purchase of certified emission reduction credits on carbon markets. 
Second, the analysis in Table 8 is crude, focuses only on the costs to the public treasury and 
excludes any other costs, some of which can be quite high. For example, it is assumed that wind 
energy can substitute directly, one-for-one for fossil fuels, which is certainly not the case (van 
Kooten 2010). Third, as noted above, Ontario is not the only jurisdiction to employ feed-in 
                                                      
15  From  http://bioenergy.ornl.gov/papers/misc/energy_conv.html  (viewed March16, 2011), coal 
releases 25.4 metric tons of carbon per terajoule (TJ) compared to 14.4 for natural gas.  Page | 26 
 
tariffs. Germany subsidies to wind, solar and hydro generation amounted to $7.3 billion in 2009 
and were forecast to rise to $11.3 billion by the end of 2010.
16
Finally, it is important to consider how FIT subsidies are paid. Currently, Ontario has not raised 
electricity rates to reflect the cost of its FIT program partly because it fears this will make 
Ontario firms less competitive and partly to avoid any political fallout. By not allowing rates to 
rise, however, there is also no incentive for consumers to reduce their electricity consumption; 
indeed, unless the cost of the FITs are passed along to consumers, rates may fall, as indicated in 
the next section, resulting in an offsetting increase in CO2 emissions (a rebound effect). Yet, in 
all likelihood, the Ontario government will eventually need to shift program costs onto 
ratepayers because the budgetary burden of large subsidies (Table 8) cannot be sustained in an 
era of fiscal restraint. At that point, political opposition to renewable energy subsidies is likely 
to increase as in Germany. 
  
Table 8: Costs and Benefits of Ontario’s Feed-In Tariff Program: Hourly CO2 Flux and Cost of 
Reducing CO2 Emissions, Various Scenarios 
 
Biomass 50%; Wind 50% 
 
Biomass 25%; Wind 75% 
Coal to NG →  1 : 0  ¾ : ¼  ½ : ½ 
 
1 : 0  ¾ : ¼  ½ : ½ 
CO2 flux  –––––––––––––––––––––––––  tCO2  –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Coal saving  1749.2  1311.9  874.6 
 
1749.2  1311.9  874.6 
NG saving  0  247.9  495.8 
 
0  247.9  495.8 
Sequestered
a  665.8  665.8  665.8 
 
332.9  332.9  332.9 
Biomass emission  2058.2  2058.2  2058.2 
 
1029.1  1029.1  1029.1 
Net flux  356.9  167.5  -21.9 
 
1053  863.7  674.3 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––  US dollars  ––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Subsidy  $272,000  $272,000  $272,000 
 
$300,000  $300,000  $300,000 
Subsidy per tCO2  $762  $1624  n.a. 
 
$285  $347  $45 
Notes: 
a Carbon sequestered in tree growth over 25 years using growth function (9.1), including all above 
ground biomass with carbon discounted at 2%.  
n.a. indicates not applicable because eliminating fossil fuel generation results in a net release of CO2 – 
there is no climate change benefit whatsoever in this scenario. 
DISCUSSION 
Unlike carbon taxes or emissions trading, feed-in tariffs distort the playing field towards the 
authority's preferred electrical generating option(s). In effect, the politicians or a regulator such 
as the U.S. EPA (i.e., the authority) selects those technologies that they feel will best accomplish 
their objectives. One objective might be to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, but clearly, given 
the questionable nature of intermittent sources of energy and the high costs of wood fiber, 
there exist other objectives that FIT programs seek to address. These objectives might include a 
                                                      
16  See  http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2010/10/05/Solar-boom-drives-up-German-
power-price/UPI-74351286299555/ (viewed October 11, 2010). Page | 27 
 
desire to create jobs, develop a wind turbine and/or solar panel production sector, eliminate 
coal burning for non-climate related reasons (replacing coal with biomass), dramatically 
increase harvests from domestic forests, diversify sources of energy, appease environmental 
lobby groups, and so on. However, these are anything but climate related objectives.  
As seen in this study, most FIT programs provide subsidies that last for a decade or more, with 
many programs also providing inflation protection to those investing in electrical generating 
capacity based on alternative energy sources that are eligible for FIT payouts. As a result, an 
electrical grid might be locked into generating assets that are not compatible with existing 
generating assets, while reducing incentives to invest in generating assets that might lower 
overall CO2 emissions in the future.  
At the same time, FIT programs can lock a government into the subsidization of power from 
alternative energy sources for an extended period. This can impose a long-term burden on the 
treasury and taxpayers. If costs can be passed along to consumers of electricity in the form of 
higher rates, then consumers are forced to pay for politically-motivated programs, ones that 
may not directly target CO2 emission reduction or do so in an inefficient fashion. Higher 
electricity rates disadvantage industry relative to industry in other jurisdictions where rates are 
lower, transfer income from general ratepayers to recipients of FIT subsidies, and harm those 
least able to pay higher rates for heating or cooling their homes.  
If the government is unable to transfer the costs of FIT subsidies to ratepayers (or simply 
desires not to), the burden on the treasury could be unsustainable. For Ontario, which has an 
average load of 16 GW, the annual cost was calculated to be some $2.5 billion or more than 
$32 billion over a 20-year project life (discounted at 7.5%), a not insignificant sum. Meanwhile, 
as demonstrated in this study, the feed-in tariff leads to a reduction in electricity prices at the 
wholesale level, while the deployment of intermittent generating capacity causes prices to 
fluctuate to such an extent that it reduces incentives to invest in new capacity. Assuming that 
part or all of the reduction in wholesale prices gets passed along to (at least some) consumers, 
there is a rebound effect that could offset any reduction in CO2 emissions by 60% or more 
(Jenkins et al. 2011). 
Given a desire to promote development of alternative energy sources for generating electricity, 
what policies might a government employ? If the sole objective is to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions, the economist would favor a carbon tax as such a tax would address the issue at 
hand. The tax would tilt the playing field against fossil fuels, particularly coal but also biomass, 
and give non-CO2 emitting renewable energy sources a leg up. However, the required carbon 
tax may need to be quite high to encourage investment in, for example, wind and solar energy, 
while it adversely affects extant generators but perhaps not enough to close them down. The 
authority might simply reject a tax in favor of feed-in tariffs because it has in mind objectives 
over and above that of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The analysis in this paper suggests 
that, if this is the case, the authority needs to consider alternative policies (e.g., construction 
subsidies to wind, solar, etc., tax holidays, capital cost allowances) that lead to investments in 
desired renewable energy alternatives. These might be more effective and less costly. Page | 28 
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Appendix: Countries with Feed-in or Other Price Subsidies for Renewable Energy 
Country  Wind  Hydro  Solar  Biomass 
Algeria         
Argentina         
Australia         
Austria         
Bosnia Herzegovina  ?  ?  ?  ? 
Brazil         
Bulgaria         
Canada         
China         
Croatia         
Czech Republic         
Denmark         
Dominican Republic  ?  ?  ?  ? 
Finland         
France         
Germany         
Greece         
Hungary  ?  ?  ?  ? 
India         
Iran  ?  ?  ?  ? 
Ireland         
Israel         
Italy         
Japan         
Luxembourg         
Malaysia         
Malta  ?  ?  ?  ? 
Mongolia         
Portugal         
Serbia         
Slovakia         
Slovenia  ?  ?  ?  ? 
South Africa         
South Korea         
Spain         
Switzerland         
Taiwan         
Thailand         
The Netherlands         
Turkey         
Ukraine         
United Kingdom         
United States         
Vietnam  ?  ?  ?  ? 
NOTES: 
Some countries such as Canada and the U.S. have separate jurisdictions that have implemented their own FITs. A ? 
indicates that a country has a renewable subsidy but little is known about it. 
Source: Derived from http://www.wind-works.org/articles/feed_laws.html (Paul Gipe, Bakersfield, CA)  